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ABSTRACT
Tax is one of the largest revenues the state has and it is  compulsory for 
both citizens and companies to pay to the state. The collected funds are 
used by the state to build state infrastructure and others. However, not 
all individuals or companies are willing to pay tax voluntarily. Some 
taxpayers even carry out tax avoidance. There are many factors that may 
affect tax avoidance practices, such as institutional ownership, gender 
diversity on board of directors, audit committee, and fi rm size. This study 
aims to determine the effect of institutional ownership, gender diversity on 
board of directors, audit committee and fi rm size on tax avoidance by using 
current effective tax rate approach and SPSS test tool version 22. The 
sample consists of 568 banking sector companies in Southeast Asia and 
they are listed on Orbis that publish fi nancial statements in English, gain 
profi t, and pay taxes in the research period. Based on the research results, 
it is found that institutional ownership has a signifi cant effect on tax 
avoidance. Likewise, audit committee and fi rm size also have a signifi cant 
effect on tax avoidance. However, gender diversity on board of directors has 
no signifi cant effect on tax avoidance.
ABSTRAK
Pajak adalah salah satu pendapatan terbesar yang dimiliki negara 
dan merupakan kewajiban bagi warga negara dan perusahaan untuk 
membayar kepada negara. Dana yang terkumpul digunakan oleh negara 
untuk membangun infrastruktur Negara dan lain-lain. Namun, tidak 
semua individu atau perusahaan bersedia membayar pajak secara sukarela. 
Beberapa pembayar pajak bahkan melakukan penghindaran pajak. Ada 
banyak faktor yang dapat memengaruhi praktik penghindaran pajak, seperti 
kepemilikan institusional, keragaman gender pada dewan direksi, komite 
audit, dan ukuran perusahaan. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui 
pengaruh kepemilikan institusional, keragaman gender pada dewan 
direksi, komite audit dan ukuran perusahaan terhadap penghindaran pajak 
dengan menggunakan pendekatan current effective tax rate dan alat uji 
SPSS versi 22. Total sampel yang digunakan adalah 568 perusahaan sektor 
perbankan di Asia Tenggara dan terdaftar di Orbis yang mempublikasikan 
laporan keuangan dalam bahasa Inggris, mendapatkan untung, dan 
membayar pajak dalam periode penelitian. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian, 
ditemukan bahwa kepemilikan institusional berpengaruh signifi kan 
terhadap penghindaran pajak. Demikian juga, komite audit dan ukuran 
perusahaan juga memiliki pengaruh signifi kan terhadap penghindaran 
pajak. Namun, keragaman gender pada dewan direksi tidak berpengaruh 
signifi kan terhadap penghindaran pajak.
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INTRODUCTION
The government needs large funds to develop 
all the regions in Indonesia. Therefore, the 
government need to increase the funds along 
with the increase in the development. In this 
case, tax is one of the largest sources of funds 
for the government which accounts for around 
70% of all state revenues (Directorate General 
of Tax, Ministry of Finance, 2012). The tax 
sector is a source of funds in the government 
administration, public services, and national 
development.
Over the past 10 years, there have been a 
lot of tax frauds committed by corporate and 
individual taxpayers that are very detrimental 
to the state. One of them is a case that occurred in 
2014 involving Bank Central Asia (BCA). BCA. 
As the largest private bank in Indonesia, it was 
busy dealing with the Corruption Eradication 
Committee (Indonesia: Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi / KPK), because on Monday, April 21st, 
2014, the KPK set Hadi Poernomo (Director 
General of Taxes) as a suspect in the case of 
the BCA Non-Performance Loan (NPL) worth 
IDR 5.7 trillion, resulting in the government 
experiencing a loss of IDR 375 billion (Sutaya, 
2014).
The same case also happened in Toyota 
Motor Company in Thailand in 2015. Toyota 
Motor Thailand experienced a very complicated 
problem related to the hybrid car, Toyota Prius. 
Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Network 
(NACN) asked the Thai fi nance minister to 
check whether Toyota Motor Thailand had 
carried out tax manipulation. If it was proven, 
Toyota Motor Thailand had to be responsible 
for domestic sales tax of 30 billion Baht, or 
around IDR 11.9 trillion (Satrio, 2015).
The two cases show how companies carry 
out tax frauds in various ways, both legally 
(tax avoidance) and illegally (tax evasion). 
Tax avoidance that is done legally can be 
carried out by utilizing loopholes existing in 
the tax law system in Indonesia and in Asia. 
According to Mardiasmo (2003), tax avoidance 
is an effort made by a corporation or individual 
to alleviate the burden of tax payable by not 
violating existing tax laws. Another opinion 
states that tax avoidance is an effort to 
reduce tax burden legally by utilizing certain 
provisions (loopholes) in the fi eld of taxation 
optimally such as the exclusion and allowable 
deductions, and making use of unregulated 
things and weaknesses existing in applicable 
tax regulations (Suandy, 2011)
According to Arifi n (2016), the board 
of directors is one component in corporate 
governance which consists of several members 
to determine policy and decision making 
within the company. The more members of the 
company’s board of directors, the better the 
management of the company, including in the 
tax effi ciency policy as an alternative for the 
management to reduce the tax burden which is 
expected to increase corporate profi ts.
The role of women is increasingly obvious 
in the company, especially related to the ability 
to become corporate leaders (Ferreira, 2009). 
This tends to be increasingly apparent when 
the board of directors is under pressure to 
have female members on board of directors 
(Ferreira, 2009). Gender diversity on board of 
directors will have an impact on the decisions 
taken, particularly in tax avoidance. Gender 
diversity on board of directors has a signifi cant 
effect on tax avoidance. This means that gender 
diversity on board of directors can increase a 
company’s tax avoidance activities (Amri, 
2017).
The larger the size of the company, 
the more the company will consider the 
risks in managing its tax burden, such as in 
transactions. In the research by I Gede Hendy 
Darmawan and I Made Sukartha (2014), it is 
stated that fi rm size has a signifi cant effect on 
tax avoidance. On the contrary, results of the 
studies conducted by Mella Virgi Amelia, Dudi 
Pratomo and Kurnia (2017) show the variable 
of fi rm size does not have a signifi cant effect on 
tax avoidance.
Ngadiman and Puspitasari (2014), stated 
that institutional ownership is share ownership 
by the government, fi nancial institutions, legal 
institutions, foreign institutions, trust funds, 
and other institutions. These institutions 
have the authority to supervise management 
performance. The existence of institutional 
ownership in a company will improve 
supervision of the company’s management 
performance.
According to the Indonesian Institute 
of Audit Committee (Ikatan Komite Audit 
Indonesia / IKAI) (2004), the main task of the 
audit committee is to assist the board of 
commissioners in carrying out the supervisory 
function of the company’s performance. This 
is related to reviewing the company’s internal 
control system, ensuring the quality of fi nancial 
statements, and increasing the effectiveness of 
the audit function.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS
Agency Theory
Agency theory is the theory underlying the 
company’s business practices. Agency theory 
is originally the synergy of economic theory, 
decision theory, sociology, and organizational 
theory. The main principle of this theory is 
the existence of working relationship between 
the parties giving authority, called investors 
or principal, and the parties receiving the 
authority, called managers or agent.
In agency theory, agency relations arise 
when one or more people (principal) employ 
other people (agent) to provide a service and 
then delegate decision-making authority to the 
agent. The relationship between the principal 
and the agent can lead to the information 
asymmetry because the agent is in a position 
that has more information about the company 
than the principal. With the assumption that 
both parties try to maximize their own interest, 
the existence of information asymmetry will 
encourage agent to hide some information 
that is not known to the principal. In addition, 
with the information asymmetry, the agent can 
infl uence the accounting numbers presented 
in the fi nancial statements by conducting 
earnings management.
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) also argued 
that agency theory is a separation between 
owners (principal) and managers (agent) who 
run the company. Agency problems arise 
because both parties always try to maximize 
their utility function. In line with the concept, 
agency theory was also proposed by Anthony 
and Govindrajan (2005: 269), that is, the 
relationship between principal and agent. 
Principal employs agent to carry out tasks 
for the sake of principal interest. Agency 
theory appears because of the phenomenon of 
separation between the owner of the company 
(shareholders) and the manager who manages 
the company
Tax Avoidance
Tax is a mandatory contribution to the 
state for those who have income in accordance 
with what is required by the state. The tax 
defi nition itself has been explained in the Law 
concerning General Provisions on Taxation 
(UU KUP, 2013) that tax is a compulsory 
contribution to the state owed by an individual 
and an entity that is forced based on the Law, 
by not getting compensation directly and is 
used for state needs for the greatest prosperity 
of the people (UU KUP, 2013).
The explanation of the article states 
that taxpayers do not receive compensation 
directly. Business people, therefore, assume 
that taxes are a burden. The greater the tax 
burden, the smaller the net profi t earned by 
the company, so it is reasonable when entities 
and individuals try to carry out tax avoidance 
in accordance with the applicable provisions 
on taxation. However, there are some entities 
or individuals who commit tax evasion by 
violating the regulations on taxation.
Sumarsan (2013: 16) defi nes tax avoidance 
as an act, carried out by taxpayers, that does 
not clearly violate the law, even though 
sometimes they clearly interpret the law not in 
accordance with the intent and purpose of the 
legislator. Sumarsan explained in his book of 
Tax Review and Tax Planning Strategy that tax 
avoidance can be carried out and infl uenced by 
three factors as follows:
1. Self-control
2. Remote Location
3. The existence of loopholes that can be utilized
Institutional Ownership
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
institutional ownership has a strategic role in 
minimizing agency confl icts that occur between 
managers and shareholders. The existence of 
institutional investors is considered capable 
of being an effective monitoring mechanism in 
every decision taken by the managers. This is 
because institutional investors are involved in 
strategic decision making, so it is not easy to 
believe in earnings manipulation.
Institutional ownership has an important 
meaning in monitoring management because 
the presence of institutional ownership will 
encourage a more optimal supervision. 
Such monitoring will certainly guarantee 
prosperity for shareholders. The infl uence 
of institutional ownership, as a supervisory 
agent, is suppressed through their considerable 
investment in the capital market. A high level 
of institutional ownership will lead to greater 
oversight efforts by institutional investors so 
that it can hinder the opportunistic behavior of 
a manager.
Gender Diversity on Board of Directors
Theory of Gendered Organizations 
explains gender diversity in organizations. 
According to Acker (1990), organization is 
a gendered process. The formation of an 
organization is through gender stages, that 
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is, through a pattern of differences between 
masculine and feminine. Gendered process 
occurs through at least fi ve interaction 
processes: (1) Distribution of constructions 
along gender lines, (2) Construction of symbols 
and images that explain, express, strengthen, 
or sometimes oppose divisions (gender 
division), (3) Processes that produce social 
gender structures, including the organization, 
is the interaction between women and men, 
women and women, men and men, including 
all patterns that defi ne dominance (power) 
and obedience. (4) This process produces a 
component of individual gender identity, 
including awareness of the existence of three 
other aspects of gender in the organization, the 
choice of suitable work, the use of language, 
clothing, and the presentation of themselves 
as gender members of an organization. 
(5) Gender is involved in the fundamental 
process, an ongoing process of creating and 
conceptualizing social structures. Gender is 
a constitutive element in family and kinship. 
It helps to frame the relationships that 
underlie other structures, including complex 
organizations.
Gender can increase the diversity of 
executive characteristics so that it is expected 
to provide an alternative solution to a problem 
which can ultimately affect tax avoidance. 
This can be explained by attribution theory 
which states that every individual action in 
the executive is infl uenced by character and 
motivation so that it can explain a decision of 
that action. The female president director can 
provide change in the organization, providing 
a strict structure through fl exible leadership 
style, trust, teamwork and control. Women 
tend to listen, motivate, provide support, and 
do better than men.
Audit Committee
Audit committee is the committee 
responsible for overseeing external audits 
and is the main contact between the auditor 
and the company (Jati, 2014). The board 
of commissioners must establish an audit 
committee consisting of at least three members 
who responsible to the board of commissioners. 
They are appointed and dismissed by the board 
of commissioners. The audit committee that 
has fewer members tends to be able to act more 
effi ciently, but it also has some weaknesses, 
such as the lack of experience of the members. 
Each member of the audit committee should 
have an adequate understanding of the 
preparation of fi nancial statements and the 
principles of internal supervision. The most 
important qualifi cations of audit committee 
members are in common sense, intelligence 
and independency (Pohan, 2008).
The audit committee has the task of control-
ling the process of preparing the company’s 
fi nancial statements to avoid fraud committed 
by management. The effectiveness of the audit 
committee also enables better control of the 
company and fi nancial statements and support 
good corporate governance. The presence of 
audit committee in a company can minimize 
fraud in fi nancial statements committed by 
management. The companies that have audit 
committees allow for effective fi nancial report 
control and can support corporate governance 
in the companies.
Firm Size
In general, the size of a company can be 
seen from equity value and sales value or asset 
value the company has. In addition, fi rm size 
can also be measured using total assets and 
total sales owned by the company. The fi rm 
size can be classifi ed as follows (Law of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 2008);
1. Micro Company
2. Small Company
3. Medium Company
4. Large Company
Based on the defi nition above, it can 
be concluded that fi rm size is a scale that 
determines the size of the company which can 
be seen from the total equity, total sales, total 
employees, total assets, and others.
Relationship between the Independent 
Variables and the Dependent Variable
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax 
Avoidance
Institutional ownership has an important 
part in monitoring management because 
the presence of institutional ownership will 
encourage a more optimal supervision, 
especially in tax avoidance. It is expected that 
the higher the institutional ownership, the 
higher the Current Effective Tax Rate (CuETR). 
If the CuETR value is high, the company will 
be more compliant with the existing laws 
and regulations and will not carry out tax 
avoidance. This explanation is supported by 
the results of the research conducted by Fadila 
(2017) that institutional ownership affects tax 
avoidance. 
The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 8, No. 1, January – July 2018, pages 109 – 120
 
113
Based on the arguments above, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Institutional ownership 
has a signifi cant effect on tax avoidance  
The Effect of Gender Diversity on Board of 
Directors on Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance carried out by companies 
is directly infl uenced by executive decisions. 
Executives play a role in determining the 
steps taken by the companies. This is also 
related to decisions in terms of tax avoidance. 
Gender diversity in the executive structure is 
recognized as having a role in making these 
decisions. The role of women in the executive 
board will infl uence the perspective and 
policies of tax avoidance, because women tend 
to comply with the rules and avoid the risks 
that might be faced someday. Therefore, it 
is expected that there will be at least 1 (one) 
woman in the executive board to realize a 
company that complies with regulations. The 
greater the number of women on the executive 
board, the higher the company’s compliance 
with regulations. 
Based on the explanation above, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Gender diversity on 
board of directors has a signifi cant effect on tax 
avoidance
The Effect of Audit Committee on Tax Avoid-
ance
The audit committee, in accordance 
with its function, assists the board of 
commissioners in supervising and providing 
recommendations to management related to 
the controls that have been carried out so as 
to prevent information asymmetry. The more 
stringent the supervision carried out on a 
company management, the better the quality 
of information produced, which in turn will 
produce effective performance (Zulaikha, 
2013). Therefore, the audit committee, with its 
authority, will be able to prevent any deviant 
behavior or actions related to the company’s 
fi nancial statements. 
Based on the explanation above, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Audit committee has a 
signifi cant effect on tax avoidance 
The Effect of Firm Size on Tax Avoidance
Firm size is a scale that determines the 
size of a company which can be seen from 
the total equity, total sales, total employees, 
total assets, and others (Ngadiman, 2014). 
The determination of fi rm size is based on the 
company’s total assets. The greater the total 
assets, the better the company’s prospects in 
a relatively long period of time. Companies 
that have large total assets indicate that the 
companies are more stable and more able to 
generate profi ts than those that have small 
total assets. Based on the research conducted 
by Ngadiman (2014), fi rm size has a signifi cant 
infl uence on tax avoidance. 
Based on the explanation above, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows 
(Figure 1).
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Firm size has a 
signifi cant effect on tax avoidance.
Figure 1
Framework
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RESEARCH METHOD
Sample Classifi cation
The population in this study is banking 
companies in Southeast Asia in the period 
2012-2016. The sample was taken by using a 
purposive sampling method with the criteria 
for the research sample as follows:
1. Banking sector companies in Southeast 
Asia listed on Orbis in the period 2012-
2016.
2. Companies that had complete fi nancial 
data and complete annual reports related 
to the variables needed.
3. Companies that did not experience a loss 
so that it would not result in a distorted 
Current Effective Tax Rate (CuETR).
4. Companies that paid taxes in the study 
period. Excluding compensation for losses, 
benefi ts of taxes, and other things that 
added to the benefi ts of the tax covered.
5. Companies that reported fi nancial data 
and annual reports using the international 
language – English.
Of the total banking companies listed on 
Orbis, there were 568 companies used as the 
research sample, based on the selection criteria.
Research Data
The data used in this study were 
secondary data taken from the third parties. 
The secondary data used were annual reports 
of banking companies. The variables are 
related to the research period 2012-2016. The 
secondary data were obtained from Orbis 
offi cial website (www.orbis.com).
Research Variables
The dependent variable is tax avoidance 
and independent variables are institutional 
ownership, gender diversity on board of 
directors, audit committee, and fi rm size.
Operational Defi nition of Variables
Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance in this study is measured 
using Current ETR, that is, the amount of 
corporate income tax paid by a company in the 
current year. The function of Current ETR is to 
accommodate the taxes paid by the company 
so that it can measure tax avoidance in the 
short term.
   Total Current Income Tax 
Current ETR = 
   Total Profi t before Tax 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is indicated by 
the percentage of institutional ownership 
in a company. The higher the percentage of 
institutional ownership in a company, the more 
effective the role of the institution in controlling 
management performance so that it can 
increase the value of the company. According 
to Siregar and Utama (2005), institutional 
ownership is share ownership by institutions, 
such as insurance companies, banks, pension 
funds, and investment banking. Institutional 
ownership can be calculated using:
The number of shares owned by institution
         X 100%
The number of shares outstanding
Gender Diversity on Board of Directors
Gender can increase the diversity of 
executive characteristics so that it is expected 
to provide an alternative solution to a problem, 
which can ultimately affect tax avoidance. 
This can be explained by attribution theory 
which states that every individual action in 
the executive is infl uenced by character and 
motivation so that it can explain a decision 
of the action. It is hoped that the increasing 
number of women in executive boards will be 
able to suppress tax avoidance in the company.
Audit Committee (AC)
Audit committee is in charge of controlling 
the process of preparing a company’s fi nancial 
statements to avoid fraudulent management. 
The effectiveness of audit committee enables 
better control of the company and fi nancial 
statements and supports good corporate 
governance. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
companies that have audit committees are 
expected to have very little possibility of tax 
evasion because there are good supervision 
and control in the company.
Audit Committee = The Number of Audit 
Committee Members in Company i in year
Firm Size
Firm size is a scale that determines the size 
of the company which can be seen from the 
value of equity, the value of sales, the number 
of employees, the value of total assets, and 
others. Firm size can be formulated as follows:
SIZE = Ln (total assets)
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Analysis Tool
Multiple linear regression analysis is used 
to examine the effect of independent variables 
(institutional ownership, gender diversity on 
board of directors, audit committee, and fi rm 
size) on dependent variable (tax avoidance) in 
banking sector companies. These banks are  in 
Southeast Asia listed on Orbis for the period of 
2012-2016 with the following equation:
Y= a +b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + e
Where:
a : Constant
b : Regression Coeffi cient
Y : Tax Avoidance
X1 : Institutional Ownership
X2 : Gender Diversity in Board of Directors
X3 : Audit Committee
X4  : Firm Size  
e  : error
RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Test
Descriptive analysis is used to provide 
an overview of the variables in this study, 
consisting of the variables of tax avoidance, 
institutional ownership, gender diversity on 
board of directors, audit committee, and fi rm 
size. The results of descriptive test are shown 
in Table 1.
Based on Table 1, CuETR has a mean 
value of 0.210646 with a standard deviation of 
0.0763058. From the descriptive data, it is found 
that there are 327 sample company data that 
have CuETR value above the average and 241 
sample company data that have CuETR value 
below the average. So, it can be concluded 
that banking sector companies in Southeast 
Asia tend to be more obedient in paying taxes. 
This is supported by the fact that the number 
of companies that have CuETR value above 
the average is greater than the number of 
companies that have CuETR value below the 
average. The greater the CuETR value, the 
higher the obedience to pay taxes, because the 
high CuETR value illustrates the company’s 
Table 1 
Results of Descriptive Test
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
CuETR 568 .0008 .4473 .210646 .0763058
IO 568 0.0000 1.0000 .629583 .2745521
GDD 568 0.0000 .7500 .159655 .1362578
AC 568 2 10 3.64 1.071
SIZE 568 15.1081 28.2100 21.325660 2.5013435
Source: Processed Data
obedience to pay taxes.
The mean value of the variable of 
institutional ownership (IO) is 0.629583, which 
means that most companies in the study are 
owned by institutional investors. There are 322 
sample company data that have institutional 
ownership value above the average, and 
the remaining 246 sample company data 
have institutional ownership value below 
the average. Judging from the mean value of 
institutional ownership, it can be concluded that 
the institution has a control and considerable 
authority in the companies. It is hoped that the 
greater number of institutional ownership can 
supervise company actions and policies so that 
the company can increase its CuETR value. 
The higher the CuETR value, the higher the tax 
burden paid by the company. This condition 
illustrates that the company is more obedient 
in paying taxes.
The mean value of gender diversity on 
board of directors is 0.15965, which means 
that the average female board of directors in 
the company is 15,965% of the total members 
of board of directors owned by the company. 
There are 259 sample company data that have 
the values of gender diversity on board of 
directors above the average and 309 sample 
company data that have the value of gender 
diversity on board of directors below the 
average. For that reason, it can be concluded 
that banking sector companies in Southeast 
Asia tend to have more male members of board 
of directors than female members of board of 
directors. The increasing number of women in 
the board of directors is expected to increase 
the value of CuETR. A high CuETR value 
illustrates that the company is able to pay taxes 
according to regulations and can be stated that 
the company complies with the tax regulations.
The mean value of audit committee is 3.64, 
which means that the average audit committee 
owned by the company is in the numbers 
from 3 to 4. There are 221 sample company 
data that have audit committee value above 
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the average and 347 sample company data 
that have audit committee value below the 
average, including 12 companies with 2 audit 
committees. STherefore, it can be concluded 
that banking sector companies in Southeast 
Asia tend to have an ideal number of audit 
committees, that is, 3. Companies that have a 
large number of audit committees are expected 
to have higher CuETR values and comply with 
tax regulations”.
The mean value of fi rm size is 21.33, which 
means that the average banking companies in 
Southeast Asia have a total asset value of $ 1.3 
million. There are 273 sample company data 
that have fi rm size value  above the average 
and 295 sample company data that have fi rm 
size value  below the average. This indicates 
that the average companies used as the sample 
have total assets of less than $ 1.3 million, in 
other words, the average banking companies 
in Southeast Asia listed on Orbis are classifi ed 
as medium companies. Larger companies will 
likely to rethink the tax burden owned, so it is 
possible that the larger companies will have 
smaller value of CuETR, indicating that the 
companies are doing tax avoidance. This can 
happen because large companies have complex 
transactions and have human resources that 
are capable of managing taxes.
Analysis Results and Discussion
Table 2 
Results of Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis
Variable CuETR Model
t-count Sig.
Institutional ownership 2.143 0.033
Gender Diversity on Board of 
Directors
0.019 0.985
Audit Committee 2.157 0.031
Firm Size -3.577 0.000
Constant 9.595 0.000
R Square 0.029
Adj R Square 0.023
F count 4.269
Sig F 0.002
Source: Processed Data
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax 
Avoidance
According to Siregar and Utama (2005), 
institutional ownership is share ownership 
by institution investors, such as insurance 
companies, banks, pension funds, investment 
banks, and other than individual stocks. 
Institutional ownership within the company 
is used as a supervisor for all actions of the 
company executive in taking business actions, 
whether the action benefi ts the company or 
not and gives a sense of responsibility to the 
company to understand that the funds used by 
the company are not only the funds belonged 
to one company but can also be owned by more 
than one company. The funds should be used 
as well as possible and not used for personal 
or group goals other than just to develop the 
company.
Based on this explanation, it can be 
ascertained that the higher the number of 
institutional ownership, the higher the current 
tax burden borne by the company, because the 
company is considered to be more compliant 
with the tax regulations and does not want to 
take actions that harm the company, therefore, 
the higher the value of institutional ownership 
within a company, the lower the tax avoidance 
practice in the company.
The variable of institutional ownership 
shows signifi cant effect. This supports the 
research hypothesis 1 (H1) which states that 
institutional ownership has a signifi cant 
infl uence on tax avoidance. Based on the 
descriptive data, the movement between the 
variable of institutional ownership and the 
variable of tax avoidance (CuETR) is in the 
same direction, meaning that whenever there 
is an increase in institutional ownership, there 
will be an increase in the tax burden borne by 
the company. The greater the tax burden borne 
by the company in a year, the higher the level of 
the company’s compliance with the applicable 
tax regulations.
The sample used in this study is banking 
sector companies in Southeast Asia. As multi-
national companies, they have more complex 
types of transaction, so that there will be many 
loopholes that can be utilized by the companies 
to reduce the tax burden they have. Based on 
this explanation, institutional share ownership 
is one way that is expected to minimize the 
loopholes in tax avoidance practices. The 
shareholders’ demands to companies to report 
their fi nancial statements as actually as possible 
put pressure on the companies to maintain a 
reputation in the eyes of shareholders.
Based on Agency Theory, it can be further 
explained that the relationship between 
the variable of institutional ownership and 
the variable of tax avoidance (CuETR) is an 
example of the relationship between agents 
The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 8, No. 1, January – July 2018, pages 109 – 120
 
117
and principals, where the agents are company 
managers and the principals are shareholders. 
The existence of different interests between the 
agents and the principals makes the difference 
in objectives in running the company. This 
condition is better known as agency problems, 
where there is a difference in objective between 
agents and principals.
The agency problem occurs when the 
company manager, as an agent, wants to get 
the maximum profi t, but the shareholders, as 
the principal, request that the company always 
be open, report the real fi nancial condition, and 
conduct business activities in accordance with 
applicable regulations. The aim is to maintain 
the corporate good name and corporate 
image in the eyes of the public, so that it can 
be ascertained that institutional ownership 
infl uences tax avoidance (CuETR).
The results of this study support the 
results of the studies conducted by Ngadiman 
and Christiany (2014), Fadila (2017) which state 
that the variable of institutional ownership has 
a signifi cant effect on tax avoidance. The results 
of this research indicate that shareholders 
tend to reject the existence of corporate tax 
avoidance in order to maintain the reputation 
of the company.
The results of this study do not support 
the results of previous studies conducted 
by Amelia, et al (2017) and Pohan (2009) 
which state that the variable of institutional 
ownership has no effect on tax avoidance in 
banking companies. Pohan (2009) argues that 
tax avoidance is part of management’s effort to 
maximize profi ts.
The Effect of Gender Diversity on Board of 
Directors on Tax Avoidance
As a member of board of directors in a 
company, someone is required to make the 
best and most appropriate decisions for the 
company. In such conditions, a man will be 
easier to make a decision because a man is 
more likely to be a risk taker than a woman. 
A man will tend to prioritize the goal of 
developing the company in various ways, 
whether it complies or violates the applicable 
provisions. In contrast, a woman will tend to 
comply with all provisions that have been set, 
both the company rules and tax regulations.
This difference will have a big effect 
when a woman becomes the Chief Executive 
Offi cer (CEO) of a company. She will put more 
pressure on the staff and managers to take 
action in accordance with the applicable laws 
and conditions. A woman will tend to be more 
risk averse than a man. This difference can occur 
because of differences in mindset between man 
and woman. For example, a woman is more 
thoughtful about all the actions that have been 
taken and how the snowball effect of the actions 
on the future of the company is. The presence 
of woman in the board of directors is expected 
to infl uence tax avoidance in the company.
The results of this study show that the 
variable of gender diversity on board of directors 
has no signifi cant effect on tax avoidance. The 
results of this study do not support the research 
hypothesis 2 (H2) which states that gender 
diversity on board of directors has a signifi cant 
effect on tax avoidance in banking companies 
in Southeast Asia. Based on the descriptive 
data, the movement between the variable of 
gender diversity on board of directors and the 
variable of tax avoidance (CuETR) is in the 
same direction. It means that whenever there 
is an increase in the gender diversity on board 
of directors, there will be an increase in the tax 
burden borne by the company, even though the 
results of the statistical test show no signifi cant 
effect. This may be due to the small number 
of women or even no woman in the board of 
directors in each company, so that female voices 
become minority. Based on descriptive data, 
overall the CEO of the companies made as the 
sample in this study is dominated by men. This 
condition puts pressure on women to follow 
the majority or male voices in decision making.
The results of this study support the results 
of the research conducted by Hanafi  and Harto 
(2014) which states that the variable of gender 
diversity on board of directors does not have a 
signifi cant effect on tax avoidance. The results 
of this study indicate that female executive 
does not infl uence corporate decision on tax 
avoidance. The differences in the principle 
of looking at problems and making decision 
between men and women do not affect the 
decision on tax avoidance practices.
The results of this study do not support 
the results of previous studies conducted 
by Winasis, et al (2017) and Amri (2017) that 
the variable of gender diversity on board of 
directors has an infl uence on tax avoidance in 
banking companies. Winasis et al. (2017) argue 
that the fundamental reason is that the presence 
of women in the corporate executive structure 
provides a more varied alternative for the 
company in carrying out its tax planning. The 
existence of women can also improve corporate 
governance in relation to good corporate 
governance because the existence of women 
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will provide more mature considerations for 
executive decisions regarding the impact that 
will be caused for company decisions from the 
legal aspect. This is because women are more 
likely to be law-abiding and risk averse.
The Effect of Audit Committee on Tax 
Avoidance
The audit committee has the duty 
to control the process of preparing the 
company’s fi nancial statements to avoid 
fraudulent management. The effectiveness 
of the audit committee enables better control 
of the company and fi nancial statements and 
supports good corporate governance.
The board of directors, which also serves 
as an audit committee in the same company, 
is feared to intervene or give pressure to other 
independent members of the audit committee 
to provide fl exibility for the management to 
carry out its role as the maker of the fi nancial 
statements.
It is expected that with the increasing 
number of audit committees, companies are 
more compliant with the applicable rules and 
regulations so that the companies are willing 
to pay taxes in accordance with the actual 
conditions and reduce tax avoidance practices 
signifi cantly.
The statistical test on the audit committee 
show signifi cant effect. These results support 
the research hypothesis 3 (H3) which states 
that the variable of audit committee has 
a signifi cant infl uence on tax avoidance 
in banking companies. These results are 
supported by descriptive data which show that 
the movement between the variable of audit 
committee and the variable of tax avoidance 
(CuETR) is in the same direction, meaning 
that every increase in the audit committee will 
increase the tax burden borne by the company. 
The high tax burden borne by the company in 
one year indicates that the company complies 
with the applicable tax regulations.
Based on the grand theory used in this 
study, the audit committee is considered 
capable of providing a good liaison between 
company management and outside parties or 
investors through good fi nancial statements. 
The audit committee as an independent board 
is expected to be able to realize good and 
healthy relationships between agents and 
principals, so that the company is able to run 
as it should be and can reduce agency confl icts.
The results of this study support the 
results of the research conducted by Sabrina 
and Soepriyanto (2013) which state that the 
variable of audit committee has a signifi cant 
infl uence on tax avoidance. The results of 
this study indicate that the audit committee 
infl uences corporate decision on tax avoidance. 
The role of the audit committee is able to 
provide better supervision of the company’s 
activities.
The results of this study do not support 
the results of previous studies conducted by 
Cahyono et al (2016) and Saputra and Asyik 
(2017) that the variable of audit committee 
does not infl uence tax avoidance in banking 
companies.
The Effect of Firm Size on Tax Avoidance
Large companies tend to have greater 
resources than small companies in carrying 
out their tax management. Large companies 
also have human resources, expert in taxation 
so that the tax management carried out by the 
companies can be maximized to reduce the 
company’s tax burden without violating the 
law. Small-scale companies cannot be optimal 
in managing their tax burden due to the lack of 
experts in taxation. Therefore, small companies 
tend to be open and compliant in reporting 
their tax burden.
The results of statistical test on the variable 
of fi rm size show signifi cant effect. The results 
of this study support the research hypothesis 4 
(H4) which states that the variable of fi rm size 
has a signifi cant infl uence on the variable of tax 
avoidance in banking companies. Based on the 
results, it can be explained that the movement 
between the variable of fi rm size and the 
variable of tax avoidance (CuETR) is not in 
the same direction, which means that every 
increase in the fi rm size will decrease the tax 
burden borne by the company, thus indicating 
that the company is doing more tax avoidance 
practices. On the contrary, any decrease in the 
fi rm size will increase the tax burden borne by 
the company, thus indicating that the company 
is doing fewer tax avoidance practices.
In connection with the grand theory 
which is the basis of this research, it can be 
explained that there is an agency confl ict 
between management and stakeholders, where 
the management, who knows that companies 
(large) have complex transactions, tends to 
choose tax avoidance practice which is contrary 
to the stakeholders’ wishes. The wishes are 
large profi ts accompanied by transaction 
openness and honesty on the company’s image, 
so that there is an agency confl ict between the 
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company management and stakeholders.
The results of this study support the 
those of the studies conducted by Ngadiman 
and Puspitasari (2014) and Darmawan and 
Sukartha (2014). They stated that the variable 
of fi rm size has a signifi cant infl uence on tax 
avoidance. The results of this study indicate 
that fi rm size infl uences corporate decision 
on tax avoidance. The bigger the company, 
the more various types of transactions will 
be handled, and the more gaps in using the 
transactions.
The results of this study do not support 
the results of the previous studies conducted 
by Cahyono et al (2016) and Amelia et al (2017) 
that the variable of fi rm size does not affect tax 
avoidance in banking companies. Cahyono et 
al (2017) argue that companies must be more 
careful in carrying out tax avoidance practice 
because it is very risky, especially relating to 
tax regulations, because large companies have 
a tendency to exploit existing gaps.
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUG-
GESTION
The conclusions of the results of statistical 
test and hypotheses test are as follows:
The result of the fi rst hypothesis test in 
shows that H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted. 
Therefore, institutional ownership statistically 
has a signifi cant positive effect on tax 
avoidance. It means that the higher the number 
of shares owned by institutional investors, the 
higher the CuETR value.
The result of the second hypothesis test 
shows that H0 is accepted and H2 is rejected. 
So, gender diversity on board of directors 
statistically does not have a signifi cant effect 
on tax avoidance. This means that the high 
value of gender diversity on board of directors 
does not affect the CuETR value. In addition, 
the low value of gender diversity on board of 
directors also does not affect the CuETR value.
The result of the third hypothesis in this 
study shows that H0 is rejected and H3 is 
accepted. So, audit committee statistically has 
a signifi cant positive effect on tax avoidance. 
This means that the higher the number of audit 
committee members owned by the company, 
the higher the CuETR value.
The result of the fourth hypothesis in 
this study shows that H0 is rejected and H4 
is accepted. So, fi rm size statistically has a 
signifi cant positive effect on tax avoidance. 
This means the higher the fi rm size or the 
higher the total assets owned by the company, 
the lower the CuETR value.
Based on the research that has been done, 
there are still several limitations as follows: 
(1) after being analysed, the research data 
were classifi ed as abnormal in distribution 
so that they had to be outlier six times using 
case wise covariate diagnostics; (2) There were 
variables that became heteroscedasticity, such 
as audit committee and fi rm size; (3) The 
value of autocorrelation using the Runs Test 
in this study showed that the research data 
experienced symptoms of autocorrelation; (4) 
There were 5 companies that did not publish 
fi nancial reports during the study period with a 
total of 25 fi nancial report data; (5) Researchers 
generalized taxation regulations for each 
country in Southeast Asia in accordance with 
taxation regulations in Indonesia.
The limitations in this study encourage 
the researchers to provide suggestions for the 
development of future research. For further 
researchers, it is recommended: (1) to use 
another test tool other than casewise coevariate 
diagnostics so that the data can be normally 
distributed. And if the data after the outlier 
show abnormal data, then the data used 
should be the data before outliers, (2) to add 
more sample companies because the sample 
represents the population used in the study. For 
that reason, the more the samples, the higher 
the generalization, (3) to add other variables 
that can detect the existence of corporate tax 
avoidance activities, such as audit quality, 
political relations, family ownership, and 
others, (4) to limit the sample companies that 
do not issue fi nancial statements, which can be 
given the number 0 at the time of tabulation, 
(5) to provide research in accordance with the 
tax rates in each country so that the conclusion 
can be according to the circumstances of each 
company in each country.
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